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Executive Registry
79-1930

21 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIOs and NFAC Office Directors

FROM : PB/NSC Coordinator

SUBJECT : Tentative Presidential Briefing Schedule (U)

1. The Director last briefed the President on Tuesday, 14 August. At that time he covered:

- Central America After Nicaragua
- Indochina Refugees
- SALT (C)

2. In the only other Presidential briefing since before the Vienna Summit, [REDACTED] on 1 August, covered:

- [REDACTED]
- Yugoslavia (NIE) (C)

3. We expect, depending on the President's schedule, to resume a more regular briefing routine after the President returns from vacation. The next scheduled Presidential Briefing is tentatively set for Wednesday, 5 September. The final decision for the topics to be covered then and in subsequent briefings will be made upon the Director's return from leave next week. (C)

4. Since there has been a relatively long time between briefings over the summer months the following summary of the status of briefing topics which were/are under consideration is provided:

a. Topics which have been dropped due to lack of briefing opportunity (however, as noted, in most cases the effort expended was translated into another art form).

- Middle East (distributed to President, et al, as a monograph)
- Cam Ranh Bay--a filler item (dropped as OBE)
- [REDACTED]--a filler item (dropped as OBE)

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☐ DCL ☒ RVW 21 Aug 99
 BY 064696

- Iran Factions (rendered OBE but being held, updated as possible future topic)
- Warsaw Pact Force Modernization (covered in the NID as a Special Analysis; being held for possible future use)

b. The following are topics which are under active consideration/being worked with a view toward possible early (September) presentation:

	<u>NFAC Action Officer</u>	<u>Briefing Coordinator</u>	
● Soviet CCC	Huffstutler		25X1A
● Energy: Aftermath of Tokyo Summit			25X1A
● Arms Control			
● E. European Trends			
● [REDACTED]			
● World Capacity to Absorb OPEC \$			
● [REDACTED]			
● EC-OAPEC			

c. The following are topics which are being explored as potential briefing topics. Any comments on these and/or any suggestions for additional topics are most welcome. (Some of these could become topics for September presentation.)


	<u>NFAC Action Officer</u>	<u>Briefing Coordinator</u>	
● ABM Treaty			25X1A
● Soviet Economy			
● Vietnam's Prospects			
● West to East Technology Transfer			
● Soviet C&D			
● European Outlook			
● Indian Subcontinent			

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NFAC
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Coordinator

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] Prospects
- Iran: Prospects
- TNF/NATO Modernization
- NE Asia: Prospects




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(S)

5. For information, two examples of talking points used by the Director are provided.

- The first is an example of those used for SCC/PRC meetings. These are to be prepared by the assigned Action Officer as part of the DCI's Briefing Book.
- The second is an example of those used for a Presidential Briefing. These are prepared quite late in the process by the Action Officer/Briefing Coordinator and continually refined by the DCI himself. You will note that the Director may make last minute handwritten changes. The marginal notations are keys to the graphics used as part of the briefing. (U)



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Attachments

cc: DDCI	D/OCO
DD/NFA	C/PPG
DDO	C/CSS/NFAC
DDS&T	C/CS/NFAC
DD/CT	C/RES/NFAC
DD/RM	SRP
LC	[REDACTED] OGCR/CD/V
NITO/CT	
ES	
EA/DCI	

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Talking Points for PRC on Nicaragua & Central America

1. Nicaragua

A. Junta hasn't yet sorted itself out

- 1) Lines of authority confused
- 2) FSLN most cohesive and effective
 - controls military
 - has set up command structure in which all 3 factions represented
- 3) In the govt., Interior Minister Borge (Marxist with FSLN base) dominant figure
 - other Marxists in Cabinet, sub-Cabinet posts

B. Policies equally unclear

- 1) First initiatives were bank nationalization, media regulation
- 2) Major issues yet to be faced:
 - a) Attitude toward formation of local revolutionary committees (a la Cuba)
 - b) Approach to econ reconstruction
 - c) Cuban connection (have direct commo links now, at least 60 medical advisors, liaison with military)
 - d) Relations with other LA states:
 - Panama has offered intelligence, other training, to military
 - Venezuela is offering police training

2. Prospects for Insurgency elsewhere

A. El Salvador most vulnerable

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1. Repressive government policy has fed rebels' cause
 2. Revolutionary warfare likely within next 6-12 months
 3. We think military will break faster than Nic. National Guard
 - lack experienced leadership, cohesiveness, training, materiel
- B. Guatemala, Honduras not likely to fall victim to stepped-up insurgency in near term.
- Guerrilla groups lack popular support and face tough governments.
3. Implications for Cuba
- A. Sees itself with secure base in Nicaragua
 - B. Looking to medium term: will pursue policy of measured increases in support to radical forces in regime
 - C. Two important potential constraints to Cuban influence/action:
 1. Pressures on Nicaragua from Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela to avoid too leftist, too revolutionary a government.
 2. Leaders of region also look to U.S. actions to contain Cuban actions.

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North Korean (NK) SNIE

- I. Twice during last year have briefed you on revised estimate NK military strength.
- A. Noted agreement on marked increase, uncertainty how much.
 - B. Analysis now largely complete.
 - C. Range of difference in numbers of NK divisions has narrowed.
 - From 8 last December to 4 today - unfortunately by agreement 4 more divisions than we thought.

II. Net results are shown this chart

- A. Numbers troops/divisions have grown dramatically over last decade - 400-700 and 25-37
 - Lots of debate on reconstruction
 - But firepower and mobility increased too- just more hardware

(Reporting NK
Mil. Strength)

Chart: 700 - 2800,
2400 - 5000,
200 - 950

- B. Accent on offensive military posture
 - Tripled river-cross equipment
 - Enlarged ranger/commando force
 - Digging tunnels under DMZ since 71 (3 exposed)
 - Heavy concentration along DMZ - not new units
 - Could attack with little warning
 - Emphasize - decade of effort

(Location of Ground
Force Div. Map)III. ^{sheet} Second ~~change~~ increasing NK military independence

- A. In early 70s USSR provided military equipment and technical assistance; mid 70s China -
 - But note drop off in PRC/USSR deliveries last 3 years
 - Due buildup own capacity except for aircraft, some electronics

(Est. NK Imports
of Mil. Equip.)

B. Now exporting weapons to Africa, Mideast and South Asia

C. No evidence of slowing production of primarily ground force's weapons

-Emphasis shifting to qualitative improvement as rate of ground combat forces has slowed

-At present pace probably + 4 divisions and brigades

• T-54's

D. Net impact - lesser outside constraint on Kim.

IV. ~~Motivating factors - why? Very costly -~~

Some time one motivating factor behind costly buildup may have been perception of Kim beginning of decade that both his sponsors, China, Soviet Union, were moving closer to U.S. - no longer rely on their support as confidently.

In addition, may have perceived back late 60's reasonable probability that by mid 70's U.S. would have withdrawn from Korea, increasing his options if he were prepared.

Either case or whatever motive - NK sacrificed a lot to place itself in this position of greater freedom to use mil. option.

V. What will constrain him - 4 things

1. Political stability in South Korea

Or - obverse - instability certainly tempt him

(Chart)

2. South Korea military force

Chart shows behind most areas 700-600; 37-21; about 1/2

Some cases quality - e.g. anti-tank

(Aircraft Chart)

Aircraft inputs dried up for NK - not much prospect

Benefits of defense; but 25 miles to Seoul.

3. Attitudes both PRC & USSR could be constraining despite Kim's relative independence of them.

4. Finally - U.S. commitment and presence.